Suchergebnisse

This paper considers a rent‐seeking game (specifically, a winner‐takes‐all contest) with incomplete information. By allowing for sequential moves, a Bayesian‐Stackelberg equilibrium can be constructed. It can be shown that, at the Bayesian‐Stackelberg equilibrium, it is always possible that the allocative efficiency argument fails. That is, there are cases in which the Stackelberg follower is more efficient but loses the contest. Using a specific class of distributions, it is also shown that sometimes the corrupt official will choose the Bayesian‐Stackelberg equilibrium over the Bayesian‐Nash equilibrium in order to maximise the expected bribe revenue. That is, when designing the rules of the rent‐seeking game, the dynamic nature of competition will be taken into account.

In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many governments extended public guarantees to banks. We take advantage of a natural experiment, in which long-standing public guarantees were removed for a set of German banks following a lawsuit, to identify the real effects of these guarantees on the allocation of credit ('allocative efficiency'). Using matched bank/firm data, we find that public guarantees reduce allocative efficiency. With guarantees in place, poorly performing firms invest more and maintain higher rates of sales growth. Moreover, firms produce less efficiently in the presence of public guarantees. Consistently, we show that guarantees reduce the likelihood that firms exit the market. These findings suggest that public guarantees hinder restructuring activities and prevent resources to flow to the most productive uses. ; [Staatliche Bankgarantien und Allokationseffizienz] Im Zuge der jüngsten Finanzkrise haben viele Regierungen ihre staatlichen Garantien für Banken erweitert. Wir nutzen ein natürliches Experiment, bei dem langjährige staatliche Garantien für eine Reihe deutscher Banken nach einem Rechtsstreit aufgehoben wurden, um die realwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen dieser Bürgschaften auf die Kreditvergabe identifizieren zu können ("Allokationseffizienz"). Unter Verwendung zusammengeführter Bank- und Unternehmensdaten zeigt sich, dass staatliche Garantien diese Allokationseffizienz mindern. Werden Garantien gewährleistet, investieren leistungsschwache Unternehmen mehr und behalten höhere Zuwachsraten beim Umsatz bei. Darüber hinaus produzieren Unternehmen im Allgemeinen weniger effizient, wenn staatliche Garantien existieren. Folgerichtig zeigen wir außerdem, dass Garantien die Wahrscheinlichkeit verringern, dass Unternehmen aus dem Markt ausscheiden. Die Ergebnisse belegen, dass staatliche Garantien Restrukturierungsaktivitäten behindern und verhindern, dass finanzielle Mittel den produktivsten Verwendungszwecken zugeführt werden.

In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many governments extended public guarantees to banks. We take advantage of a natural experiment, in which long-standing public guarantees were removed for a set of German banks following a lawsuit, to identify the real effects of these guarantees on the allocation of credit ("allocative efficiency"). Using matched bank/firm data, we find that public guarantees reduce allocative efficiency. With guarantees in place, poorly performing firms invest more and maintain higher rates of sales growth. Moreover, firms produce less efficiently in the presence of public guarantees. Consistently, we show that guarantees reduce the likelihood that firms exit the market. These findings suggest that public guarantees hinder restructuring activities and prevent resources to flow to the most productive uses.

In this paper, input subsidies (fertiliser subsidies to be
exact) have been related to the allocative efficiency of fertiliser
input. Fertiliser was singled out not to ignore other inputs but to
emphasise the fact that fertiliser accounts for at least 30 percent of
the total farm expenditure in most of Asia, and the rest of the expense
is accounted for by labour (which is primarily family labour). The
regression results are based on a sample survey data of 150 farms of
Khulna Division (Bangladesh) for the year 1986-87. We have first
estimated a production function based on Hoque (1991) and then
calculated the efficiency indices based on the estimated parameters of
the production function. In the second stage regression, different farm
sizes were regressed on efficiency indices which showed an overall
inverse relationship (that is, the smaller the farm size, the higher the
efficiency). This tendency is observed upto the size of 10 acres in case
of fertiliser input. Thus, the farms upto the size of 10 acres should be
subsidised to promote efficiency in production. However, if the
selective subsidy programme is difficult to administer, 'one hundred
percent subsidy may be worthwhile. It is argued that the withdrawal of
the fertiliser subsidy will reduce efficiency and have an adverse impact
on employment and output in the rural sector of Asia. The IFPRI (1987)
study on Indonesia also clearly indicates this. Some indicative
discussions in Section II and Section V support the statistical results
in favour of fertiliser subsidy.

AbstractAn alternative approach to measuring allocative efficiency within experimental markets is proposed. This approach incorporates the traditional efficiency measure, the deadweight loss of economic surplus, and an additional measure that captures income (value) redistribution between buyers and sellers resulting from individual transactions at prices that deviate from equilibrium. An extension is made to construct an additional measure to further discriminate between markets that appear similar in terms of pricing efficiency, which reflects the rate at which prices converge toward equilibrium. Previous conclusions regarding the relative pricing efficiency of different experimental markets need to be reexamined using the more comprehensive measures.